Introduction
When the eighth anniversary of the Gulf War ceasefire arrives, we will see a recalcitrant Saddam Hussein still in power in Iraq. Years of sanctions, U.N. inspections, and aerial occupation have been debilitating for the U.S. military and administration.
With no end in sight, it's tempting to renew claims that the Gulf War ceasefire was premature. The proposition is that by "extending the ground war for another hours" we could "have broken the back of the Republican Guards, the true mainstay of Saddam Hussein's regime". 1 In doing so, we would have precipitated Saddam's fall from power and saved ourselves a great deal of grief in the long run. If this speculation is accepted as a matter of faith, it may impact how future wars are fought and terminated.
Therefore, it's important to discuss the Gulf War ceasefire. Was it premature, resulting in missed opportunities, or the right call? Chapter One will argue that the timing of the Gulf War ceasefire was appropriate given military and political constraints, the difficulties in disposing of Saddam Hussein, and the questionable desirability of doing so.
The belief that the premature ceasefire was a critical mistake is so widely-held that it must be addressed before confronting the real problem impacting the Gulf War termination.
Although the timing of the Gulf War ceasefire was appropriate, it was nonetheless an impulsive decision. Political and military leaders hadn't planned for the ceasefire or the military and political events that followed. They didn't know where or when the military campaign should stop. Coalition forces weren't ready for the transition from a military to a political focus. The U.S. and its allies failed to anticipate or prepare for the uprisings within Iraq. General Schwarzkopf was given no political guidance prior to the ceasefire negotiations. Altogether, the Gulf War termination was a mess. Chapter One argues that the problem wasn't one of timing. Nor was the problem fundamentally a lack of prior planning, although very little was evident. Chapter Two asserts that the underlying problem was a disconnect between goals and the means to pursue them. The coalition was fighting a limited war in the sense that, for various reasons, it would not invade and subjugate Iraq. In spite of limited measures, the U.S. established a goal, or desired end state, that involved the removal of Saddam Hussein. The pursuit of an ambitious end state without the means to directly effect it resulted in a confused and unpredictable war termination. The Gulf War termination was further complicated by a variety of halfmeasures designed to indirectly achieve the desired end state. These measures failed to achieve their objective, and instead produced tragic unintended consequences.
Notes
Chapter 1
Gulf War Ceasefire: Missed Opportunities or the Right Call?
But if the administration's aim was also to undermine the Saddam Hussein regime…the failure to complete the destruction of the Republican Guard detracted from those goals since it gave Saddam Hussein more loyal troops to suppress his enemies.
-Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor The Generals' War
Critics of the ceasefire decision cite the number of surviving Republican Guards divisions as the unfortunate result of an early war termination. Estimates are that "about 4 1/2 of Saddam Hussein's eight Republican divisions-the Adnan, the Nebuchadnezzar, the Al Faw, the 8 th Special Forces, and part of the Hammurabi-escaped the Allied onslaught". 1 This count matches CIA photo analysis which determined at least 365 of escaping tanks were T-72s belonging to the Republican Guards. Since the CIA estimates that the Republican Guards began the war with 786 T-72s, roughly half got away. 2 In assessing the ceasefire decision, the question isn't how many got away, but how many could we have stopped and at what cost? The situation on the battlefield during [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] February 1991 makes these difficult questions.
Fog of War
As the ground war progressed, the ferocity of the coalition offensive, the collapse of the Iraqi army, and its rapid withdrawal from Kuwait created substantial confusion abut the location and status of Iraqi units. General Powell had anticipated the chaos and warned the press prior to the ground offensive: "A land offensive will not be like the air campaign. The battlefield would be a swirl of dust and confusion." 3 By midday on 27
February 1991, General Powell advised the White House "that the Iraqi Army was so thoroughly dismembered that allied intelligence can't find divisions, can't find brigades, can't find battalions. It's all just shattered." 4 As evidence of this "fog of war," the 24 th Mechanized Infantry Division (Mech) fought one of the biggest battles of the war two days after the ceasefire. The "Battle of Rumalah" began when U.S. forces were suddenly engaged by an "Iraqi brigade-sized armor and mechanized force (composite of Hamurabi and regular forces) that was making an attempt to escape". 5 Historical accounts of 3 rd Army's operations during the final days and hours of the ground campaign contain no mention of the location of the escaping Republican Guards divisions, with the sole exception of part of the Hammurabi division, reported in and around Basra on the morning of 1 March. 6 In light of this confusion, it's hard to tell how many Iraqis, let alone particular units, could have been prevented from escaping.
Race to the Euphrates
At 73 Easting and Medina Ridge, VII Corps fought Republican Guards units that had assumed blocking positions to allow other Iraqis to escape through Basra. "The 'Mother of All Battles' had turned into a race to the Euphrates, and the Iraqis had a big head start. Guards armored division) couldn't have been intercepted. Units further south were not as lucky. Iraqis that were beyond 50 miles from Basra when they began their retreat escaped "in tattered shreds, having lost or abandoned virtually all their equipment to ground pursuit, air interdiction, and maintenance collapse". 11 Brown's assessment is supported by the experience of a surviving Iraqi officer: "We were anxious to withdraw, to end the mad adventure, when Saddam announced withdrawal within 24 hours-though without any formal agreement with the allies to ensure the safety of the retreating forces.
We understood that he wanted the allies to wipe us out: he had already withdrawn the Republican Guard to safety. We had to desert our tanks and vehicles to avoid aerial attacks. We walked 100 kilometers towards the Iraqi territories; hungry, thirsty and 
Basra
The tactical problem at Basra was much different than the open desert. "The Basra area is a complex sprawl of marsh, river, irrigation canals, villages, and jumbled-together city featuring building separated by twisted streets." To make matters worse, "one wellreputed Republican Guards division had dug into the defense of the town". 16 19 The battle of Basra had the potential to be the riskiest and costliest operation of the war.
Highway of Death
Continued hostilities, even if limited to air attacks on retreating Iraqis, would have been expensive in political terms. The U.S. administration was deeply concerned about the perceived slaughter of Iraqis. Reports of the "Highway of Death" from Navy pilots were quickly forwarded to CENTCOM and on to the White House. The reaction of U.S.
decision makers was similar to AWACs crewmember Major John Kinser: "That was the low point of the war for me. A couple of times I found myself thinking, 'Man, this is just a slaughter down there'". 20 Army attack helicopter pilots shared this feeling. "Aviators from the 101 st and 12 th Aviation Brigades expressed concern that they were having problems discriminating between armed and unarmed soldiers in the fleeing mass…"
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This sensitivity weighted heavily on the decision to end hostilities on 28 February. At the White House meeting that decided the ceasefire, President Bush was concerned that "we do not want to lose anything now with charges of brutalization". 22 Motives were not simply humanitarian. Political pressures were behind the desire to avoid charges of slaughtering Iraqis.
Arab reaction to the killing of fellow Arabs had to be considered. On 24 January, the New York Times reported that the Egyptian public, "shocked by the force and breadth of the allied bombing" was becoming more sympathetic to Iraq. Three days later "the the result of all the negative publicity was to increase pressure to step up the timing of the planned ground assault in an effort to bring the war to a speedy conclusion". 26 Arab reaction wasn't the only issue. General Schwarzkopf recalls General Powell's concern prior to the ceasefire: "He told me that in Washington the controversy over wanton killing had become uncomfortably intense-even the French and the British had begun asking how long we intended to continue the war." showing. In a speech, "he expressed alarm over the 'fragility' of U.S.-Soviet relations and hinted broadly that unless the coalition leaders showed 'responsible behavior', by which he clearly meant restraint, relations between Washington and Moscow would be in serious jeopardy". 30 Brent Scrowcroft, the National Security Advisor, was sensitive to
Mr. Gorbachev's position: "I believe these attempts by Gorbachev to mediate were aimed primarily at salvaging some influence and bolstering his ever-weakening political strength at home. He was fighting for his political survival… It was a dilemma.
Gorbachev had done so much to help us rally the international response to Iraq, and to isolate their former client, and we felt tremendous sympathy for him and his plight." 
Removing Saddam
Although not stated in national or military objectives, the ouster of Saddam Hussein was an implicit war aim. Air planners operated with an "intent to convince the Iraqi populace that a bright economic and political future will result from the replacement of 
Kurd and Shiite Uprisings
This brings us to the uprisings that did occur. As the coalition offensive ended, Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south responded to Bush's call to action. The rebellions failed for three reasons. First, they lacked organization. Second, with or without the Republican Guards, Saddam retained the ability to suppress the uprisings.
Third, not wanting the rebels to succeed, the U.S. stayed out of the fight.
The uprisings suffered from a lack of leadership, organization, and coordination. "It was the 'popular uprising' for which every opposition leader, from modern leftist to traditional cleric, had been calling throughout the first Gulf war. Yet most had given up hope of it ever happening and none were remotely prepared for putting it into practice." Units in central reserve included a mechanized division, a Republican Guards motorized division, and the Iraqi helicopter fleet. 48 These forces were more than adequate to deal with unsupported uprisings that "appeared to lack the organization, unity, and power deemed necessary to topple a weakened but still entrenched dictatorship". 49 From what we now know about the uprisings that did take place, and about the internal situation in Iraq, it is hard to make the case that another day of fighting would have made the difference between Saddam's survival and ouster. No doubt the task of suppression would have taken somewhat longer if the regime had been deprived of the use of heavy armor and helicopters; but the ultimate outcome of a battle between battered but still disciplined troops and a rebellion that was disorganized and lacking in overall leadership or any plan of action beyond taking revenge on local officials was never in doubt.
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The uprisings were doomed to fail without U.S. support. Unfortunately for the rebels, neither the U.S. nor its coalition partners wanted them to succeed. In 1991 Iran played a role in making propaganda and it provided weapons to some Iraqi rebel groups, particularly to the Badr Brigade… The Brigade was composed of Iraqi Shi'is recruited from among refugees expelled to Iran by the Baath in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it appears that several thousand of the entered Iraq a few days after the insurrection had started. In training and arming these refugees, Iran demonstrated the continuity of its traditional aspirations to gain leverage over Iraq by influencing Shi'i affairs in the country. 56 As the uprising gathered force, the overthrow of Saddam by the ruling elite didn't occur. In order to avoid precipitating the breakup, or "Lebanonization" of Iraq, the U.S. Given the risks, the U.S. reluctance to support the rebels was understandable. Since the uprisings were likely to fail without direct U.S. participation, and their success wasn't in our interests, they shouldn't be used in arguing that the Desert Storm ceasefire was premature.
Lebanonization of Iraq

Summary
Arguments for extending hostilities another 24-48 hours fail to consider the "fog of While the timing of the Gulf War ceasefire was appropriate, it was by no means a premeditated act. Clearly, the ceasefire was a spur-of-the-moment decision and the U.S.
was unprepared for the post-ceasefire political, military, and civil situation. As General Schwarzkopf's chief foreign policy advisor at CENTCOM stated: "We never did have a plan to terminate the war". 1 Critics contend that the haphazard Gulf War termination resulted from lack of a commonly understood and well-defined end state. This argument doesn't ring true. There was, in fact, a commonly understood desired end state. In addition to expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the destruction of Iraq's offensive military capability, the U.S. sought a unified Iraqi state with Saddam Hussein removed from power. This chapter will argue that the fundamental problem during the Gulf War was a disconnect between the means we were willing and able to employ and our desired end state. Limited in its means, the U.S. took various half-measures to achieve its desired end state. Instead of achieving their objectives, these half-measures resulted in unforeseen and tragic consequences. Without a clear link between goals and means, the ends were inevitably unpredictable, confused, and undesirable.
Limited War, Limited Objectives?
The Gulf War was a limited war in the sense that the U.S. never intended to invade the whole of Iraq and subjugate its government and people. The limitation stemmed from the U.N. mandate, our coalition partners, and the U.S.' distaste with the prospect of invading Iraq. In his memoirs, General Schwarzkopf argues against the notion of capturing Baghdad, citing the inevitable fracturing of the coalition, the cost of occupying Iraq, and the certainty "that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit".
Objectives one, two, and four are clear, limited, and easily translated into achievable military objectives and a recognizable and obtainable end state. Objective number three is problematic. The problem began when its associated desired end state exceeded our ability and commitment to achieve its effect.
Desired End State
Joint Pub 3-0 defines an end state as "the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives" and stresses that defining the desired end state is the critical first step in the planning process. 6 During the Gulf War, one of our strategic objectives was "security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf". The desired end state involved a weakened, yet intact Iraq, and the removal of Saddam Hussein by Iraq's ruling elite. While this end state was never formally stated, it was widely understood:
• President Bush: "While we hoped that a popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the United States nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state."
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• General Powell: "What was hoped for frankly, in a postwar Gulf region was an Iraq still standing with Saddam overthrown." 8 • CENTCOM: "The military strategy saw regional stability in terms of an Iraq whose military capability had been so degraded that it could not threaten its neighbors but not a dismembered Iraq…" 9
• CENTAF: "The strikes, in coordination with others, would not just neutralize the government but change it by inducing a coup or revolt that would result in a government more amenable to Coalition demands." 10 This end state entailed the disposal of an entrenched dictator, but only by particular elements within Iraq, and only in a manner that enabled Iraq to remain a unified state.
Unfortunately, the U.S. was willing neither to pursue this goal through direct means nor to pay the associated price of nation-building and humanitarian relief. Instead, the U.S.
attempted a variety of half-measures to achieve its desired end state. Given modest means and ambitious goals, it's not surprising that the Gulf War termination would be immersed in confusion, ambiguity, and unintended consequences.
Half-measures
The U.S. attempted to achieve its desired end state by encouraging a coup by the American support and protection, and his subsequent stance of non-intervention as a betrayal of that pledge. Shivering on their bleak mountaintops, and dying at a rate of one to two thousand a day, every Kurd interviewed by the western media thought so." 16 During the uprising and brutal suppression, the State Department estimated that "Kurds are dying at a rate of 600 a day on the Turkish border. Another 1,000 or more may be dying on the Iranian border, the victims are the weakest, the children and the aged". 17 An estimated two million Kurdish refugees languished on the borders of Turkey and Iran, while hundreds of thousands of Shi'a fled to the marshlands of southern Iraq.
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"Having failed to anticipate either the rebellion or the subsequent repression, the United
States was unprepared for the humanitarian crisis that followed." 19 Instead of achieving its desired end state, the U.S. incited rebellions it neither expected nor desired. The staggering human tragedy and the long-term impact on U.S. credibility were unintended consequences of pursuing disproportionate ends through limited means.
Gulf War air planners developed an air campaign to achieve the desired end state. 
Lessons Learned
In the Gulf War, the U.S. faced the unusual prospect of overwhelming defeat of the enemy's military in the confines of a limited war. With military victory assured, we sought to reorder the Iraqi government in a manner favorable to U.S. interests. However, we were unwilling and/or unable to pay the military, political, and financial costs needed to directly secure that objective. The result was an imbalance in the goals-ways-means elements of strategy. When means are insufficient to directly achieve desired goals, it's likely that results will be undesirable, uncertain, and unforeseeable. This situation makes war termination a difficult and confused process and encourages half-measures with associated unpredictable consequences.
The implicit objective of encouraging the overthrow of Saddam Hussein complicated the war termination. In hindsight, this goal should have generated several questions prior to the war:
• What happens if the Iraqis are expelled from Kuwait and Saddam is still in power?
• How long will we pursue measures designed to topple Saddam?
• Do we expect a political backlash if we continue hostilities after Iraqi forces in Kuwait are defeated?
• Is it possible the Kurds and Shiites might rebel, if so, how will we react? Are these rebellions counter to U.S. interests? Are we obligated to provide military or humanitarian assistance?
These would have been difficult questions to answer. If asked, they might have warned us of the problems inherent in our strategy. By the war's end, the world's sixth largest air force had been severely damaged, and Iraq's army was halved in size. Iraq lost an estimated 2,633 tanks out of 5,800, 2,196 artillery pieces out of 3,850, and 324 fixed-wing combat aircraft out of an estimated 650-700. 25 War termination planning and decision-making would have been greatly simplified. We have fastened upon a formula for going to war-in which American casualties are minimized and protracted engagements are avoided-that requires the massive use of American firepower and a speedy withdrawal from the scenes of destruction…. Its peculiar vice is that it enables us to go to war with far greater precipitancy than we otherwise might while simultaneously allowing us to walk away from the ruin we create without feeling a commensurate sense of responsibility. It creates anarchy and calls it peace. In the name of order, it wreaks havoc. It allows us to assume an imperial role without discharging the classic duties of imperial rule. and rehabilitate would have been considerably lessened". 27 When the means are limited, so must be the objectives. The result will be a more predictable war termination with less risk of undesirable unintended consequences.
Notes
Conclusion
Frustrated by Saddam Hussein's longevity, future U.S. strategists may be tempted to draw the wrong lessons from the Gulf War and its termination. Advocates of the "missed opportunity" theories ignore the complexity and risks associated with removing the Iraqi dictator. The fact is the U.S. underestimated the endurance of Saddam's regime. 
